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Abstract 
 
The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original 
perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and 
remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote 
memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained 
reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same 
memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an 
observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a 
memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the 
number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-
term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily 
altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible. 
 
 
Key terms: early memories, remote memories, memory perspective; field memories, 
observer memories, vantage point 
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In one of the first ever surveys of human memory Henri and Henri (1898) noted that 
some of their respondents occasionally described seeing themselves in their memories, a 
phenomenon later described by Freud (1915) as being indicative of a memory that had been 
‘edited’ or recoded. Nigro and Neisser (1983) revived interest in memory perspective and 
introduced the terms ‘field’ and ‘observer’ perspectives to denote respectively: a memory that 
preserves something approximating to a person’s original point-of-view during the 
experience that is remembered or, alternatively, a memory in which the person sees or 
observes him/herself. The perspective experienced when a memory initially comes to mind is 
thought to arise non-consciously and unintentionally, although this perspective is not 
necessarily stable during extended recall of the same memory and may change as the 
remembered event unfolds (Bernsten & Rubin, 2006; Rice & Rubin, 2009). Others have also 
pointed out that perspective can be intentionally changed and that rememberers can switch 
back and forth between perspectives (Robinson & Swanson, 1993).  
 
A number of studies have revealed that field perspective is more common than observer 
perspective, with only a minority of memories recalled with an observer perspective (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983; Rice & Rubin, 2011). Nigro and Neisser (1983) proposed several factors that 
may contribute to the determination of memory perspective, in particular the age of the 
memory: recent experiences are more likely to be remembered from a field perspective and 
older events from an observer perspective. This is now a well-established finding (Frank & 
Gilovich, 1989; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982; Rice and Rubin, 2009; Sultin & Robins, 
2009;). Field perspective memories also predominate for experiences that were emotional at 
the time of their encoding (D’Argembeau et al., 2003; LaBar, & Rubin, 2004; Strongman & 
Kemp, 1991). However, Robinson and Swanson (1993) found that emotionality can be 
influenced by manipulating the perspective. Participants were asked to recollect 
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autobiographical events from various times in their lives, to classify each memory as either 
‘field’ or ‘observer’ and rate its emotional intensity on two levels – how the event made them 
feel when it took place and how they felt about it at recollection. One week later, participants 
recalled the same events a second time – either from the original vantage point or from the 
alternative perspective – and again rated their past and present emotional intensity. Although 
there was little change in the ratings of original and current emotionality when the vantage 
point remained constant or when it shifted from observer to field, there was a marked 
decrease in both measures when the perspective was switched from field to observer. As 
Schacter (1996) has remarked, these results suggest that not only does the emotional intensity 
of an event depend in part on how one goes about remembering it, but also the emotions one 
attributes to the past sometimes arise from the way in which memories are retrieved in the 
present. 
 
 Field perspective memories are, then, associated mostly with a feeling of re-
experiencing the phenomenological features of the original event, accompanied by a high 
degree of vividness and recollective experience. Further, specific and detailed memories are 
more likely to be recalled with field perspective. In contrast, observer memories contain more 
descriptive detail but less sensory and emotional information (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2003; McIsaac & Eich, 2002, 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Sutin & 
Rubin, 2010), typically have longer retention intervals (e.g, Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Rice, 
Talarico, & Rubin, 2005; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), and higher levels of self-awareness or 
self-evaluation are reported as being present in the original experience (Frank & Gilovich, 
1989; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). However, individuals reporting 
disorders such as social anxiety or body dysmorphic disorder report memories from an 
observer perspective that are highly vivid and emotionally intensive (Hackmann, Clark, & 
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McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; , Hackmann, & Veale, 2004; Osman, 
Cooper Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). Observer memories may also be associated with 
personality factors, for example, McIsaac and Eich (2004) found that the observer perspective 
predominates when publicly self-conscious individuals recollect their social interactions (see 
also Robinson & Swanson, 1993) or when people high in ‘harm avoidance’ (characterised by 
excessive worrying, pessimism, shyness, being fearful, and easily fatigued) recall their 
earliest autobiographical experiences (Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982). Related to this, 
situations involving a high degree of self-awareness, social anxiety, or physical threat (e.g., 
speaking in public, running from danger) give rise to more observer than field recollections 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Finally, instructions to concentrate on the objective circumstances 
surrounding an event often evoke memories with an observer perspective, whereas asking 
people to focus on the feelings associated with the original event typically elicits memories 
recalled with a field perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). 
 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether switching memory perspective 
would give rise to the characteristics associated with the altered perspective. For example, if a 
memory originally and spontaneously recalled with an observer perspective was switched to a 
field perspective, would the changed perspective give rise to a memory with more specific 
details?  And, conversely, if a memory originally recalled with a field perspective was 
subsequently recalled with an observer perspective, would this result in fewer reportable 
details, particularly of emotions and feelings? These questions about the effects of changing 
perspective are important, given that police officers commonly believe that if they recreate 
the original encoding environment during an interview (a sort of super-field perspective) this 
will enhance a victim’s memory and their ability to retrieve of specific details (Wells, 
Morrison, & Conway, 2011). The cognitive interview (CI; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) is a 
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questioning technique used by police to enhance retrieval of information from witnesses. This 
approach is now one of the most widely used and accepted forms of interviewing in both the 
US and the UK (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman, 1984), and is currently taught to 
police recruits in the UK (Dando & Milne, 2009). The CI has been shown to elicit detailed, 
yet accurate, reports from adult witnesses (Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2005; Kohnken, 
Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999), children (Geiselman & Padilla, 1988; Memon, Wark, Bull, & 
Koehnken, 1997), and older witnesses (Wright & Holliday, 2007b). We suggest that, at least 
in part, the CI may powerfully reinstate a field perspective and, possibly in this way, enhance 
recall of details. 
 
In the present study participants were instructed to recall six early and six recent 
memories. In each case, they were asked to state the perspective with which the memory was 
recalled and asked to provide subjective recollective measures such as vividness, emotional 
intensity and personal importance. Previous studies (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & 
Swanson, 1993) have found that early memories are predominantly recalled with an observer 
perspective whilst recent memories are predominantly recalled with a field perspective. 
Asking participants to provide memories from both of these age groups in the current study 
allowed for this to be tested and controlled for. The recollective measures were recorded in 
order to investigate whether perspective switching would alter the qualitative nature of the 
memories. One week later, participants were cued to recall the same memories again but 
instructed to switch the memory perspective. They were asked to provide the same 
recollective measures as at time 1. We expected that when the switch was from field to 
observer that fewer episodic details would be recalled relative to the first, field-perspective, 
memory. However, when the switch was from an observer perspective to a field perspective 
memory we expected that more episodic details would be recalled in the second recall 
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relative to the first observer-perspective recall, i.e. memory would be enhanced. Further, in 
line with current literature (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Rice & Rubin, 2011) we expected 
memories recalled with a field perspective to be reliably more vivid, personally important and 
emotionally intense as compared to memories recalled with an observer perspective. We 
expected that when participants switched from field to observer perspective, these three 
variables would be rated reliably lower. Relatedly, when the switch was from an observer 
perspective to a field perspective memory we expected these three variables to be rated as 
reliably higher. Such a pattern of findings would, in several ways, lend support to the CI and 
to investigator-interviewing practices. 
 
Method 
Participants 
There were thirty-three females and two males, with a mean age of 21.5 (SD = 8.74) 
years, recruited from the general population. Participants were tested in small groups or 
individually in the laboratory. Participants completed the two sessions in the same way, such 
that if they were tested in small groups in session one, they were also tested in the same small 
group in session two. Participants received a small honorarium or, if they were students, 
course credits. All participants spoke English as their first language. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The study was conducted in two sessions. In the first part of the study, time 1 (t1) 
participants completed a questionnaire. The questionnaire began with an information page 
outlining key instructions regarding the nature of the memories to-be-sampled, and collected 
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minimal demographic data (age, gender and whether English was their first language).  
Respondents were also informed that after recalling their memories they would be asked to 
answer some questions about the memory. For these questions they were instructed not to 
guess or infer but to only respond if they actually remembered the answer. 
Participants then moved to the next page of the questionnaire proper. They were 
instructed to recall and then write a title and description (in the box provided) of an early 
memory (before the age of 10) or a recent memory (1-5 years ago). Participants had to recall 
a total of six early memories and six recent memories. The order of age of memory was 
counterbalanced. The title was to be only a few words in length but of sufficient specificity 
that if it was read again it would serve as a reminder of the to-be-recalled memory. The 
memory description was to be about a paragraph or so in length. The memory itself had to be 
one that the participant was certain they remembered, not based on, for example, a family 
photograph, family story, or any source other than direct experience. The memory had to be 
for a specific one-off event that lasted no longer than minutes/hours. It was specifically 
emphasised that the memory should not be of a routine or repeated event. After entering the 
title and memory description participants then answered the following questions: (1) is the 
memory seen from the field (approximating your original point-of-view) or from an observer 
perspective in which you ‘see’ yourself in the memory, or from neither perspective? (2) How 
vivid is the memory? (vividness) (3) How intense was your emotional response to the 
memory? (emotionality) (4) How important has this event been for you personally? (personal 
importance) (5) How old were you when the remembered event happened (to the nearest 
year)? Questions 2, 3, and 4 were answered by checking a box on a 5-point scale where 1 = 
low, 3 = moderate, and 5 = high, intermediary numbers were used to garner finer-grained 
answers. 
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In part two of the experiment, time 2 (t2) one week later, participants were presented 
with another questionnaire. Again, the questionnaire began with an information page 
outlining key instructions. In a random order, participants were presented with the memory 
titles they had provided one week earlier. Participants were instructed to recall the memory, 
but were given a perspective from which to recall it (always the opposite to the original 
perspective). On the next page of the booklet the first memory title appeared. Participants 
then answered the following questions about their memory: (1) How difficult did you find 
writing this memory? This was on a 3-point scale (1 = not very difficult, 3 = very difficult); 
(2) Were you able to use the memory perspective specified? Participants responded yes or no; 
(3) In the past week how often have you thought about this memory? (Note this question was 
included to assess the amount of rehearsal the memory had received between test sessions): 
(4) Did you recall a) the memory, b) your previous description, c) mix of a and b; (5) Overall 
how vivid is this memory?; (6) Overall, how intense was your emotional response to the 
memory?; (7) How important has this event been for you personally? Questions 3, 5, 6, and 7 
were answered by checking a box on a 5-point scale where 1 = low, 3 = moderate, and 5 = 
high, intermediary numbers were to use for more fine-grained answers. 
 
Results 
Qualitative aspects of the memories 
There were 396 memories in total. Recent memories could be broadly classified into 
several categories, including memorable birthday (43%), a particular exam (26%), a 
memorable holiday (13%), occasion/birth of a relative/achievements (18%). Early memories 
included categories such as illness/injury (24%), birth of a relative (30%), holiday trips and 
birthdays (46%). The majority of the memories were everyday mildly positive memories. 
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Coding of memory details 
All memories were coded by the first author. Interrater reliability was assessed using a 
subset of 50 coded memories from the database. These were coded by an independent coder, 
who was not aware of any other aspect of the research. The linguistic content of each 
memory was analysed by categorising every detail, determining whether it was related to an 
action, place, people, a sensory-perspective detail, affect, cognition, time sign or an object 
(Loveday & Conway, 2011). Correlating the coding produced by the first author and 
independent coder showed consistency across all categories, (actions r = .71, p < .001; people 
r = .75, p < .001; place r = .92, p < .001; sensory-perspective detail, affect, cognition, time 
and sign and object had a mean correlation of r = .86, p < .001).  
 
Analyses 
Unless otherwise stated, data were analysed using linear mixed effects models in 
order to account for the hierarchical structure (multiple memories nested within each 
participant). The analyses were conducted using RStudio Version 0.99.89 (RStudio Team, 
2015), 1me4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) and Ordinal (Christensen, 2015). Fixed 
effects differed depending on the specific analysis, however ‘participant’ was entered as a 
random effect in all models. All generated models were compared with a null model (a model 
with a constant in place of fixed effects) and p-values were obtained using likelihood ratio 
tests.  
Memories at Time One 
Of the 396 memories that were generated at time one, 198 were rated as recent 
memories and 198 as early memories. A linear mixed effect model with memory age 
included as a fixed effect showed that recent memories contained reliably more episodic 
 11 
 
detail (M = 13.93. SD = 8.09) than early memories (M = 16.07, SD = 8.06), (X2 (1) = 11.15, p 
< .001). Ordinal mixed effects models with memory age as fixed effect showed that recent 
memories were also rated higher in vividness (M = 4.24, SD = 0.91), (X2 (1) = 78.34, p < 
.001) and emotional intensity (M = 3.73, SD = 1.05), (X2 (1) = 39.11, p < .001) than early 
memories (vividness M = 3.37, SD = 1.12, emotional intensity M = 3.13, SD = 1.12). 
However, these differences may be accounted for by the fact that recent memories were 
reliably higher in personal importance (M = 3.61, SD = 1.17) than early memories (M = 2.83, 
SD = 1.29), (X2 (1) = 44.93, p < .001). Turning to proportions of perspective as a function of 
memory age, we expected participants to have more field perspectives for recent memories 
and have more observer memories for early memories, following Freud (1974) and Nigro and 
Neisser (1983). A binomial mixed effects model revealed a reliable difference in perspective 
as a function of memory age (X2 (1) = 45.88, p < .001). The probability of recent memories 
being recalled with a field perspective was 90.1% and the probability of recent memories 
being recalled with an observer perspective was 9.9%. Conversely, the probability of an early 
memory being recalled with a field perspective was 39.7% and probability of recall with an 
observer perspective was 60.3%. Note, there were no participants who reported they could 
not decide a memory perspective. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
An ordinal logistic mixed effects model was applied to the data with recollective 
measures entered in separate models as the fixed effect. Results revealed that field memories 
were more vivid (X2 (1) = 51.29, p < .001; M = 4.04, SD = 1.02 vs M = 1.87, SD = 1.01); 
emotionally intense (X2 (1) = 36.03, p < .001; (M = 3.66, SD = 1.04 vs M = 3.44, SD = 1.01) 
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and personally important (X2 (1) = 34.86, p < .001; M = 3.46, SD = 1.8 vs M = 3.19, SD = 
1.04), compared to observer memories. 
Memories at Time Two 
Across both perspectives, most participants rated writing the memory as ‘easy’. An 
ordinal logistic mixed effects analysis showed that difficulty in writing did not differ between 
perspectives (X2 (1) = .81 p = .37). Over both perspectives, 79.67% of respondents said they 
were able to change perspective and 20.33% stated they could not change perspective. When 
asked to switch perspective from observer to field, 78.9% of participants said they could 
change perspective and 21.1% said they could not. When asked to switch perspective from 
field to observer, 80% said they were able to do so and 20% said they were not. There were 
no reliable differences in the ability to change perspective as a function of original 
perspective taken (X2 (1) = 36.55, p < .06, p = .81). Memories in which participants stated 
they were unable to change perspective were omitted from the analysis. When asked how 
often the memory was thought about, 94.2% of respondents reported less than three times in 
the week. However, 2.2% of respondents reported more than four times in the week and 3.6% 
of respondents did not respond to the questions. Therefore these memories were removed 
from the analysis as they had been highly rehearsed or their rehearsal frequency was 
unknown. Finally, when asked about the recall of memory, 92.3% of participants recalled the 
actual memory, 1.8% of respondents recalled the previous description (these memories were 
removed from the analysis), 2.6% of respondents recalled a mix of the memory and 
description and 3.3% of respondents did not respond to the question (these memories were 
also removed from the analysis).  
 For the remaining results we grouped recent and early memories together. Memories 
were contrasted across time one and time 2 and our analyses focused on differences in 
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episodic detail and recollective qualities between observer and field perspectives. There are 
five analyses reported:  
1. Field t1 (Ft1) switched to Observer t2 (O(F)t2 
2. Observer t1 (Ot1) switched to Field t2 (F(O)t2 
3. Field t1 (Ft1) contrasted with Field (originally Observer) t2 (F(O)t2 
4. Observer t1 (Ot1) contrasted with Observer (originally Field) t2 (O(F)t2;  
5. Field t2 (originally observer) contrasted with Observer t2 (originally field). 
1. Field t1 (Ft1) switched to Observer t2 (O(F)t2 
We were primarily interested to see the pattern of episodic details after instructing 
participants to switch memory perspectives. A linear mixed effects analysis revealed more 
overall episodic details in field t1 (Ft1) memories than after the memories had been switched 
to an observer perspective. There were also reliable differences in the number of action, 
places, people, sensory-perspective detail, affect, cognition and time and sign in Ft1 
memories (see row 1, table 2). Ordinal logistic mixed effects analyses were performed to 
further assess vividness, emotional intensity and personal importance across memories at 
time 1 and 2. The analysis showed that memories recalled with a field perspective were 
reliably more vivid (X2 (1) = 359.94, p < .001; M = 4.06, SD = 1.02 vs M = 1.87, SD = 1.04); 
emotionally intense (M= 3.66, SD = 1.08 vs M = 2.65, SD = 1.01) and personally important 
(X2 (1) = 7.92, p < .005; M = 3.46, SD = 1.25 vs M= 3.19, SD = 1.06) as compared to 
memories switched from field to an observer perspective. 
2. Observer t1 (Ot1) switched to Field t2 (F(O)t2) 
A linear mixed effects model revealed that more episodic details were recalled for 
memories recalled with an Observer perspective at t1 (Ot1), compared to after they had been 
switched to a Field perspective at t2 (F(O)t2). Moreover, there were more actions, places, 
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people, sensory-perspective detail, time and sign and object details recalled in Ot1. There 
were no reliable differences in affect and cognition (see row 2, table 2). Ordinal logistic 
mixed effects analyses revealed that memories recalled with an Observer perspective at t1 
were reliably more vivid X2 (1) = 48.77, p < .001, (M = 3.22, SD = 1.15) than memories that 
had been switched to a field (observer) perspective at t2, (M = 2.14, SD = 0.94). There were 
no reliable differences in emotional intensity or personal importance. 
3. Field t1 (Ft1 contrasted with Field (Observer) t2 (F(O)t2 
Memories recalled with a field perspective at time 1, had more episodic details 
compared to memories that had been switched to a field perspective at time 2. Specifically, 
there were reliable differences in overall episodic details, and across all the episodic details 
(see row 3, table 2). Ordinal logistic mixed effects analysis was performed to assess 
vividness, emotional intensity and personal importance across time. The analysis showed that 
memories recalled with a field perspective at time 1 were reliably more vivid (X2 (1) = 
149.18, p < .001, M = 4.06, SD = 1.01 vs  M = 2.18, SD = 1.02); emotionally intense (X2 (1) = 
36.03, p < .001, M = 3.66, SD = 1.08 vs M = 2.9, SD = 1.2); and personally important (X2 (1) 
= 36.55, p < .001, M = 3.46, SD = 1.25 vs M = 2.65, SD = 1.02) than memories that had been 
switched to a field perspective at time 2. 
4. Observer t1 (Ot1) contrasted with Observer (Field) t2 (O(F)t2 
A comparison of memories that had been recalled with an observer perspective at 
time 1 with memories that had been switched to an observer perspective at time 2 revealed 
that there were more overall episodic details recalled for time 1 than time 2. However, when 
turning to the analysis of recollective detail, results showed that there were only reliable 
differences for affect and cognition (see row 4, table 2). An ordinal logistic mixed effects 
analysis showed that memories that had been switched to an observer perspective at time 2 
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were reliably more vivid (X2 (1) = 72.79, p < .001, M = 3.22, SD = 1.15 vs M = 1.87, SD = 
1.2); emotionally intense (X2 (1) = 20.31, p < .001, M = 3.44, SD = 1.03 vs M = 2.9, SD = 
1.2); and personally important (X2 (1) = 36.55, p < .001, M = 3.19, SD = 1.2 vs M = 2.65, SD 
= 1.18) than memories that had been originally recalled with an observer perspective at time 
1. 
5. Field t2 (originally observer) contrasted with Observer t2 (originally field) 
When comparing memories that had had their perspectives switched at time 2, we 
found no reliable differences for episodic details (see row 5, Table 2). Memories switched to 
an observer perspective at time 2 were found to be more vivid (X2 (1) = 3.32, p < .001, M = 
3.46, SD = 1.14 vs M = 2.65, SD = 1.2); emotionally intense X2 (1) = 17.05, p < .001, M = 
3.44, SD = 1.03 vs M = 2.9, SD = 1.2) and personally important X2 (1) = 20.61, p < .001, M = 
3.19, SD = 1.2 vs M = 2.65, SD = 1.18) than memories that had been switched to a field 
perspective at time 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Discussion 
 
 Confirming previous findings, we found that early (childhood) memories were 
dominated by observer perspective in contrast to recent memories that were dominated by 
field perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993).  Field memories were 
found to be rich in episodic details, vivid, emotionally intense, and personally important 
compared to observer memories, which were reliably less rich in episodic detail, and not as 
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vivid, intense, or personally important. We assume that all memories are initially encoded in 
long-term memory with a field perspective, with the possible exception of memories encoded 
during altered states of conscious, i.e. during trauma and/or intoxication. The present findings 
clearly suggest then that older memories, and some recent memories spontaneously recalled 
with observer perspective, have undergone some sort of recoding. As none of the memories 
recalled in this study indicated any altered states of consciousness they must then have been 
recoded from field to observer perspective and are now spontaneously recalled with the 
recoded observer perspective. As field memories contain more episodic details than observer 
memories this recoding process might be thought of as a type of forgetting in which some 
episodic detail is lost. Possibly, observer memories are a more efficient form of storage in 
long-term memory because they contain fewer details, and over time, consolidation processes 
seek to recode most memories into an observer perspective. Why this does not take place for 
all memories is unclear but it may be that vividness, emotionality, and importance render 
some memories immune to such recoding. On the other hand, even recent memories lower in 
these qualities may be more rapidly recoded into observer perspective. Furthermore, Eich et 
al. (2011) propose emotionally negative vivid memories are often recalled with an observer 
perspective. They further suggest observer perspective may facilitate emotional regulation 
and emotional distancing from the event, suggesting that the psychological and physical pain 
of reliving an aversive experience can be attenuated by recalling the event from the eyes of a 
dispassionate observer (Benson, McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005; D’Argembeau & van 
der Linder, 2004; McNamara, Williams & Mould, 2007; Wilson & Ross, 2003). 
 It is clear that people can change memory perspective and imagine seeing themselves in 
a memory or imagine something approximating to their original view. Intentionally 
manipulating memories in consciousness appears to an ability many people have. For 
example, intentionally imagining false details in an otherwise ‘true’ memory is something 
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many people find relatively easy (Justice, Morrison, & Conway, 2013). Perhaps many acts of 
imagery-based memory manipulation are undertaken spontaneously in everyday thinking, i.e. 
imaging how an experience might have had an alternative outcome, or how one might have 
acted differently, and of course imaging future events based on memories of previous 
experiences. Indeed, Conway, Loveday, and Cole (2016) suggested the term the 
remembering-imaging system (rather than just ‘memory’) to highlight how memory supports 
imagining. Thus, switching memory perspective is one of several ways in which memories 
can be manipulated by imagination. When switching memory perspective from field to 
observer in the present study it was found that most participants were able to successfully 
construct an observer memory, one that had less episodic details, and was not as vivid, 
intense or personally important as the original field memory. However, when switching an 
observer memory, originally and spontaneously recalled with an observer perspective, to a 
field memory, the memory now with a field rather than observer perspective, was not rich in 
episodic details, and there were no differences in intensity or personal importance. In other 
words, although for the rememberer the memory perspective has changed, the qualities of the 
memory were not those of a field memory. By the above reasoning this is because the 
memory has been recoded in long-term memory into an observer memory and even though 
by an act of imagination the perspective can be changed, this does not reinstate all the 
episodic detail originally encoded in long-term memory. Thus changing to a field perspective 
will not increase the recall of episodic details, as some have suggested (Fisher & Geiselman, 
2010). 
 This finding is important because it clearly shows that switching perspective, from 
observer to field, does not enhance memory for episodic details nor does it enhance the 
recollective qualities of a memory which remain at a level lower than that associated with 
memories spontaneously recalled with a field perspective. This has implications for 
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interviewing techniques that attempt to improve recall using field perspectives, such as those 
used by the police or in clinical settings (e.g., psychotherapy, reliving in cognitive 
behavioural therapy [CBT]): although it is possible to change perspective, this act does not 
alter other qualities of the (originally observer perspective) memory.  However, this 
limitation may only apply to memories of emotionally positive memories such as those 
recalled in the present study, and it may be the case that memories of emotionally negative 
experiences – the type of memories that police and clinicians typically deal with – would 
show a different pattern. One possibility is that memories of negative experiences are initially 
represented in long-term memory with both perspectives but are typically retrieved with an 
observer perspective. Possibly, as others have suggested (Freud, 1915; Nigro & Neisser, 
1983), such a retrieval bias serves the purpose of protecting the rememberer from potentially 
destabilising negative emotions triggered by the memory. If this were the case, then guided 
protracted retrieval attempts aimed at accessing a field perspective representation of a 
memory might indeed lead to increased recall of more detail, heightened emotion, and 
enhanced memory vividness.  
 
Related to this Conway, Meares, and Standart (2004) described the case of a 
posttraumatic stress (PTSD) patient who was present during the 9/11 terrorist attack in New 
York. This patient had an intrusive memory of seeing himself flying in peaceful silence 
above the first plane to strike. In reality he had been on the ground in a group of terrified 
onlookers. In his CBT reliving treatment, he eventually came to recall being in the group of 
onlookers and as this was achieved so his levels of PTSD diminished. Memory intrusiveness 
was markedly reduced, to something similar to that of a more typical memory of an 
emotionally negative experience. Interviewed after his recovery he claimed to now have both 
memories, one of seeing himself flying, and the other of being on the ground watching the 
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plane strike the tower: the former an observer memory with the qualities of such a memory 
and the later a field memory also with the qualities of a field memory.  
 
The present findings show that changing from an observer to a field perspective, at least 
for memories of mildly positive everyday experiences, does not instate other field memory 
qualities, i.e. greater recall of details and raised affect. On the other hand, changing 
perspective from field to observer does instate observer memory qualities, i.e. lower recall of 
details, reduced emotion and vividness. Thus, changing to observer perspective essentially 
reduces both the quantity, quality and intensity of recollected experience. We suggest, then 
that observer memory perspective memory, is a type of forgetting and may be common for 
memories of emotionally mild everyday experiences with lengthy retention intervals: in short, 
it is what these memories become as the retention interval increases. Memories with observer 
perspective may be a more information-efficient form of representation in long-term memory. 
In contrast memories of emotionally intense experiences, especially negative experiences, 
may retain their field perspective for longer periods of time and, possibly, have dual 
representations as both field and observer memories in long-term memory.
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Table 1. Count (and proportions) of early and recent memories recalled with a field and 
observer perspective 
 Field Observer 
Recent 166 (83.84%) 32 (16.16%) 
Early 113 (57.07%) 85(42.93%) 
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Table 2. Likelihood ratio test results, means and standard deviations for outcome measures per analysis conducted 
 
Analysis Results Episodic 
Details 
Actions Places  People  Sensory 
Perspective 
Affect Cognition Time and 
Sign 
Field t1 
switched to 
Observer t2 
X2 47.75**  15.49** 10.50** 4.12** 17.03** 6.07** 10.37** 42.71** 
Ft1 mean 
(S.D)  
15.99 (8.3) 3.73 (2.59) 2.15 (1.76) 3.24 (2.74) 2.4 (2.1) 0.84 (1.09) 0.73 (1.1) 1.56 (1.21) 
O t2 
mean 
(S.D) 
11.57 (7.4) 2.83 (2.43) 
 
1.67 (1.58) 2.74 (2.4) 1.76 (1.58) 0.62 (0.98) 0.47 (0.8) 0.54 (0.85) 
Observer t1 
switched to 
Field t2 
X2 
 
33.21** 
 
5.42** 
 
5.86** 
 
6.7** 
 
9.81** 
 
0.92 0.44 15.17** 
 
O t1 
mean 
(SD) 
12.04 (6.71) 3.56 (2.42) 1.51 (1.26) 2.68 (2.36) 2.1 (2.59)  0.4 (0.93) 0.2 (0.74) 0.77 (0.96) 
F t2 mean 
(SD) 
7.92 (4.6) 1.93 (1.82) 1.13 (1.16) 1.95 (1.49) 1.27 (1.13) 0.61 (0.93) 0.35 (0.61) 0.32 (0.56) 
Field t1 
contrasted 
with Field t2 
X2 
 
89.35** 
 
28.8** 
 
29.95** 
 
16.54** 
 
20.73** 
 
10.4* 
 
10.65* 
 
36.71** 
 
F t1 mean 
and SD 
15.99 (8.3) 3.73 (2.59) 2.15 (1.76) 3.24 (2.74) 2.4 (2.1) 0.84 (1.09) 0.73 (1.1) 1.56 (1.21) 
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F t2 mean 
and SD 
7.93 (4.61) 1.94 (1.82) 1.94 (1.82) 1.97 (1.49) 1.24 (1.1) 0.45 (0.69) 0.25 (0.53) 0.31 (0.56) 
Observer t1 
contrasted 
with  
Observer t2 
X2 
 
6.87* 
 
0.04 0.04 0.89 8.25* 
 
0.75 0.03 3.88* 
 
O t1 
mean and 
SD 
12.04 (6.71) 3.56 (2.42) 1.51 (1.26) 2.68 (2.36) 2.1 (2.59)  0.4 (0.93) 0.2 (0.74) 0.77 (0.96) 
O t2 
mean and 
SD 
 
11.57 (7.4) 2.83 (2.43) 
 
1.67 (1.58) 2.74 (2.4) 1.76 (1.58) 0.62 (0.98) 0.47 (0.8) 0.54 (0.85) 
Field t2 
contrasted 
with 
Observer t2 
X2 
 
8.85* 
 
2.92 7.82 3.3 0.37 1.3 1.29 4.85 
Field t2 
mean and 
SD 
7.92 (4.6) 1.93 (1.82) 1.13 (1.16) 1.95 (1.49) 1.27 (1.13) 0.61 (0.93) 0.35 (0.61) 0.32 (0.56) 
Observer 
t2 mean 
and SD 
11.57 (7.4) 2.83 (2.43) 
 
1.67 (1.58) 2.74 (2.4) 1.76 (1.58) 0.62 (0.98) 0.47 (0.8) 0.54 (0.85) 
 
** p<0.001; * p<0.005 
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